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PRE-MERGER GROWTH AND PROFIT
CHARACTERISTICS OF LARGE
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
IN THE UNITED STATES:
1948-1968
STANLEY E. BOYLE*
In recent years, concern has been evidenced from many quarters re-
garding the trend and competitive significance of conglomerate mergers
among the largest American manufacturing corporations. Many view this
as a wholly desirable turn of events, while others, principally economists
and government officials, view this as a crushing blow to the continued
viability of our economic system. To those in this latter group, the spectre
of giant American business looms larger and larger.
For about 40 years, beginning with the work of Berle and Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property,' continuing and growing con-
cern has been voiced over the increased control over business sales, assets,
and profits which is exercised by a limited number of firms. Kaplan,
2
Weston,8 Stigler 4 Edwards,5 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)6
among others, were interested in this phenomenon during the period im-
mediately following the close of World War II. Each of them, in a different
way and for somewhat different reasons, pointed out that substantial in-
creases in the level of concentration were a significant factor affecting the
strength of competition in American industry.
Once again, renewed emphasis has been placed upon the rise of general
concentration and upon the increased significance of conglomerate mergers.
*Professor of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute College of Business. B.A.,
Washington State College, 1954; M.A., Washington State College, 1955; Ph.D., University
of Wisconsin, 1959; Chief, Division of Industrial Analysis, Bureau of Economics, Federal
Trade Commission, 1962-1966; Senior Staff Economist, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department
of Justice, 1961-1962.
The collection of the basic data used in this paper was begun while the author
was Chief, Division of Industrial Analysis, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commis-
sion. My thanks to Donald C. Darnton and Joseph P. McKenna for their comments on
an earlier draft of this paper, and to Alice Mae Nicholsen for her untiring assistance
in the preparation and analysis of much of the data contained in this paper over the
past year. The views expressed are those of the author.
1 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1936).
2 A. KAPLAN, BIG ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM (1954).
3 J. WESTON, THE ROLE OF MERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF LARGE FIRMS (1961).
4 Stigler, The Statistics of Merger and Monopoly, J. POL. ECON., Feb. 1956, at 64.
5 C. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION: REQUISITES OF A GOVERNMENTAL POLICY 91-
155 (1949).
6 FTC, REPORT ON CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION IN MANUFACTURING: 1935 TO 1947 AND
1950 (1954); FTC, REPORT ON CONCENTRATION OF PRoDvCTIvE FACILITIES: 1947 (1949);
FTC, REPORT ON DIVERGENCE BETWEEN PLANT AND COMPANY CONCENTRATION: 1947 (1950).
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This movement has been most pronounced during the last five to six years.
Papers submitted by a variety of economists during the 1964-1966 Economic
Concentration Hearings of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, 7 and recent
studies by Narver,8 Martin,9 Reid,10 Kelly," Turner, 12 and others have
focused attention upon the merger problem in general; but more specifically,
attention has been focused on the economic problems which attend a rapid
rise in conglomerate merger activity. Despite the substantial efforts which
have been devoted to such mergers in recent years, relatively little of a de-
tailed nature is known regarding their actual competitive effect. Studies con-
ducted thus far deal primarily with the number of such mergers which have
occurred, the industries of the acquiring and acquired firms, and in the case
of large mergers, the size of the acquiring and acquired firms. These data,
while vital and necessary to undertake any general economic analysis of
these events, do not by themselves provide a sufficient background for ap-
praising their competitive significance. Some studies have devoted them-
selves primarily to hypothesizing about the competitive effect of such
mergers. These provide a useful theoretical base for subsequent evaluations
of large conglomerate mergers, but by themselves provide few insights into
the real problems raised by them.
This study deals primarily with what 1 feel are some neglected aspects
of the analysis of merger activity. It is my feeling that an adequate analysis
of the post-merger competitive significance of such acquisitions should take
into account some of the pre-merger financial and growth characteristics of
the firms which are acquired. In other words, if we are to appraise the effect
of such mergers upon competition, we must be able to appraise the probable
viability of the acquired firms in the absence of merger.
Some economists and others have alleged that the attitudes of the anti-
trust agencies toward mergers might well be modified if they viewed merger
as a logical alternative to bankruptcy. One exponent of this position, Donald
Dewey, has expressed the opinion that a substantial proportion of firms
being acquired fit into the category of "potentially" failing firms."a Building
upon this concept, Henry Manne argued that if in fact this was the case,
then merger activity should be looked upon simply as a more efficient
method of transferring corporate assets, and thus, insuring continuity of
7.Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 89th Cong,, 1st
Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1964 & 1965).
8 J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET COMPETITION (1967).
9 D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACr (1959).
10 S. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS AND THE ECONOMY (1968).
11 E. KELLY, THE PROFITABILITY OF GROWTH THROUGH MERGER (1967).
12 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv.
1313 (1965).
13 Dewey, Mergers and Cartels: Some Reservations About Policy, 1961 AM. ECON. REv.
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corporate activity.' 4 Both Dewey and Manne assume, either explicitly or
implicitly, that an increase in monopoly power is not the basic purpose of
most acquisitions. While not assuming that conglomerate mergers are re-
sponsible for increased monopoly in individual product markets, Walter
Mead is concerned with the effect of conglomerate merger upon the "in-
stantaneous increase in the earnings per share of any acquiring company
due solely to the merger and totally independent of operating efficiency.""
Despite the increased concern over the impact of the recent wave of
merger activity, only a limited number of useful empirical studies exist. The
most important of these have been undertaken by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, including its Economic Report on Corporate Mergers (FTC Re-
port),'6 which was completed in October, 1969. This rather sizable report
represents, for the most part, a collection and updating of a study which had
been made over the past five years, with the addition of some new material.
Because of the variety of new problems raised by conglomerate mergers,
many have argued that new approaches and analytical techniques are neces-
sary if we are to make serious progress in appraising the competitive impact
of conglomerate merger. Nowhere has this dissatisfaction been more evident
than in statements by some members of the FTC. In a recent speech, Com-
missioner Philip Elman highlighted his concern in this way:
To borrow a phrase from Mr. Justice Holmes, it seems to me that at
this time we need "investigation of the obscure" more than further
"education in the obvious."
What is obvious- and disquieting - is the impact of the current
merger movement on the structure of the economy. The number and size
of conglomerate mergers have substantially increased in recent years; the
percentage of industrial assets owned by the largest 200 firms has increased
significantly in the past two decades . . . and mergers have contributed
substantially to this increase in aggregate concentration.
What is "obscure," however, and in need of further investigation,
are the actual competitive consequences of these merger-induced structural
changes.'?
In a separate statement attached to the recently completed FTC Report,
Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones echoed this theme, but in a somewhat
different form. She pointed out that detailed analysis of actual industry
conditions is preferable to general and sometimes vague theorizing. More-
over, such data are indispensable to any analysis of competitive mergers. In
commenting on the recent FTC Report, she pointed out that the:
[S]taffs conclusions and recommendations could have been made before
14 Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, J. POL. ECON., Apr. 1965,
at 110-20.
15 The Concept of Instantaneous Merger Profit as a Conglomerate Merger Motive,
Address by Walter J. Mead, Western Economic Association, Aug. 1969.
16 BUREAU OF ECONOMics, FTC, ECONOMIc REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS (1969) [here-
inafter cited as FTC REPORT].
17 Conglomerate Mergers: The Need for "Investigation of the Obscure," Address by
Philip Elman, American Bar Association, New York City, Oct. 23, 1969.
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this study was initiated. In making its conclusions and recommendations,
staff is asking the Commission and the public to share its faith in the
anticompetitiveness of conglomerate mergers, and to substitute that faith
for hard data.' 8
Thus, both Commissioners Elman and Jones suggest that innovative
and detailed investigation of post-merger industry and company conditions
is necessary. As a part of this approach, considerable attention should be
devoted to the pre-merger viability of the acquired companies. Was the
company a failing concern? Was it nearing bankruptcy? Was it in danger of
stagnation and eventual demise? Or, on the other hand, were the acquired
companies growing and viable corporations, as strong or stronger than others
of their size and in their industry? In an effort to answer some of these
questions, this paper examines the pre-merger viability of some 700 large
acquired companies. Others may take these data and together with their
own arrive at their own conclusions regarding the competitive significance
of the disappearance of these large corporations.
The purpose of this paper is relatively limited. It is aimed solely at
providing information, heretofore unavailable, regarding the pre-merger
growth and financial conditions of a substantial sample of the total of all
large manufacturing and mining corporation mergers which occurred be-
tween 1948 and 1968. It is not designed to provide answers to all, or even
a substantial number, of the unanswered questions which exist regarding
the competitive significance of conglomerate mergers.
Part I of this paper looks briefly at the recent trend of merger activity,
comparing its significance with that of the other two major waves of merger
activity which have occurred in the United States.
Part II contains a short comparison of some selected characteristics of
the sample used here with those of all large mergers. Particular atteption is
devoted to their distribution by asset-size class of acquired company and
by type of merger.
Part III examines the pre-merger profitability of the sample firms and
compares the results obtained in this study with those obtained in two
earlier FTC studies. Specific attention is devoted to the pre-merger viability
of firms involved in conglomerate and other types of mergers. Also, it com-
pares the profitability of the large acquired companies with all manufac-
turing corporations.
Part IV examines the growth characteristics of the sample firms over
the five years prior to their acquisition. This analysis notes growth patterns
in both the absolute level of profits and corporate assets. The analysis notes
differences, where they exist, by the type of merger.
Part V summarizes the results and suggests some logical extensions of
the analysis.
1SJones, Separate Statement, in FTC REPORT XIII, Unfortunately Commissioner
Jones' comment implies that the results of the Staff Report were both trivial and pre-
determined. Any serious examination of the Report shows that such conclusions are un-
warranted and untrue.
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I. THE TREND OF MERGER ACTIVITY
One of the most pronounced trends in American industry has been the
substantial increase that has occurred in the rate of disappearance via merger
of manufacturing and mining corporations in recent years.
The data contained in Table I show the rapid growth in merger activ-
TABLE I
MERGER PATTERNS IN MINING AND MANUIVACTURING,
SELECTED YEARS: 1948-1968
Large
All Large Conglomerate
Year All Mergers Mergers Mergersa
1948 223 6 2b
1953 295 23 12b
1958 589 37 24b
1963 861 71 47b
1968 2,442 201 161
a Large mergers are defined as those in which the acquired firm had assets of $10
million or more at the time of acquisition.
b Estimates for specific years arrived at by adjusting the number of large mergers for
that year by the five-year average of large conglomerate mergers around date shown.
SOURCE: BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, STAT. REP. No. 3, CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER
ACTIVITY, 1968 (1969); BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE
MERGERS Tables 1-1, 1-6, and Appendix Table 1-1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT].
ity, particularly in the growth of large conglomerate mergers, since 1948.
The annual rate of firm disappearance has increased tenfold over this period,
while the rate of large firm merger increased by a multiple of 30. The num-
ber of large conglomerate mergers has grown at an even faster rate.
Over the period 1948-1968 a total of 1,276 large corporations were ac-
quired. Of these, 1,180, or approximately 92 percent, were acquired between
1955 and 1968. The rate of increase was particularly rapid during the last
three years of this period. The number of such mergers increased from 99
mergers in 1966, to 167 in 1967, and to 201 in 1968. While the number of
these large mergers doubled, in the past three years the value of assets ac-
quired has more than tripled - from $4.2 billion in 1966 to $12.8 billion
in 1968.19 Thus, there is little doubt that we are undergoing a tremendous
increase in merger activity, particularly among large manufacturing and
mining companies. The magnitude of this movement can be seen by com-
paring the increase in merger activity over the 1964-1968 period with that
shown by Carl Eis in his recent study of merger activity in the five-year
period, 1926-1930,20 and in Nelson's earlier study of the 1898-1902 period.21
Nelson showed that in the peak five years of the first major merger
19 FTC REPORT 42-49.
20Eis, The 1919-1930 Merger Movement in American Industry, 12 J. LAw & ECON.
267-96 (1969).
21 R. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1895-1956, at ch, 5 (1959).
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period, some $6.3 billion of capital assets were involved in mergers.22 Eis
concluded that $7.3 billion is a reasonable estimate of the capital involved
in acquisitions during the peak years of the second merger movement.23
These appear to be rather minor amounts when compared with the amounts
involved in mergers of mining and manufacturing companies over the five-
year period, 1964-1968. In the most recent period, the total amount of capital
was about three times the combined capital assets of acquired companies in
both of the earlier peak periods -$40.0 billion compared with $13.6 bil-
lion.24 Thus, the current merger movement is without parallel in the in-
dustrial history of the United States.
II. COMPARISON OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS
The analysis included in this paper is based upon a portion of the
large acquisitions reported by the Federal Trade Commission during the
past 20 years. Specifically, it examines the pre-merger profit and growth ex-
perience of 698 of the 1,276 large manufacturing companies which were
acquired between 1948 and 1968 - about 55 percent of the total. Two fac-
tors explain the exclusion of the other 45 percent. First, the vast majority
of the excluded firms (more than 375) represent the acquisition of privately-
held companies, for which accurate financial data were not available. The
remainder were excluded because of our inability, to obtain complete five-
year profit and growth data for them from standard statistical and financial
manuals.
A question of some interest is the impact, if any, that the omissions may
have on the validity of the results obtained. In other words, do the excluded
companies have some characteristics which, when excluded, tend to bias
the direction of the resulting data? To answer this question, I have compared
the sample used with three characteristics of the total population of large
mergers - by type of acquisition, by size of acquired firm, and by average
size of acquisition.
The figures shown in Table II indicate the problems involved in ob-
taining data for relatively small corporations, particularly where an attempt
is made to obtain data covering a full five year period preceding the acqui-
sition. This latter problem explains the difference between the "Listed" and
"Sample" totals. No firm was included in the sample unless data were avail-
able for it for all five years prior to its acquisition. Despite the differences in
the number of firms included in each size class, a simple exercise in long
division indicates that the average size of the listed and unlisted companies
in each size group is roughly the same. The one major exception to this is
in the $250 million and over size class. No unlisted companies of that size
have been acquired.26 The smallest difference was in the $100-250 million
22 Id. at 37.
23 Eis, supra note 20, at 295.
24 FTC REPORT Appendix Table 1-2.
25 Unlisted companies, as used in this context, are those companies which are either
privately-held or which are not listed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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TABLE II
DISTRmUTION OF LARGE ACQUIRED MINING AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS,
BY SIZE Or ACQUIRED COMPANY: 1948-1968
(as percent of total large acquisitions)
Distributions of AcquisitionsAsset Size of
Acquired Company All Large Listed Sample
$10-25 Million 57.3 51.7 42.9
25-50 Million 23.1 24.5 27.8
50-100 Million 11.8 14.6 16A
100-250 Million 6.0 7.5 9.6
250 Million & Over 1.8 1.6 3.3
NOTE: Figures subject to rounding.
SouRcE: FTC; MooDY's INDUSTRIAL MANUALS, various issues; company annual reports.
size class -less than $1 million. The largest was in the $50-100 million size
class- about $3 million.
From the point of view of this paper, the data contained in Table III
are of somewhat more significance than those in Table II. The distribution
of mergers by type of merger activity in the sample that is being used is al-
most identical with that in the total. The sample contains slightly more
horizontal and conglomerate mergers, and a slightly smaller proportion of
vertical mergers.
TABLE III
DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE ACQUIRED MINING AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS,
BY TYPE OF ACQUISITION: 1948-1968
(as percent of total acquisitions)
Type of
Acquisitions All Acquisitions Sample Mergers
Horizontal 16.2 16.8
Vertical 13.6 12.3
Conglomerate 70.2 70.9
SoURCE: FTC; MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUALS, various issues; company annual reports.
In sum, it would appear that the sample of mergers used in this paper
is representative of the total number of such mergers which occurred during
this period, particularly in terms of average size and type of acquisition. The
difference in the distribution of firms by asset-size class is basically a func-
tion of the fact that the bulk of the unlisted companies which were acquired
were in the smallest asset-size class - $10-25 million. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to compare the other relevant characteristics, i.e., profitability and
growth.
III. PRE-MERGER PROFITABILITY
As a result of certain allegations made in the past regarding the finan-
cial viability of acquired companies, two other studies have included brief
analyses of the profitability of large acquired companies. It was not the
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basic intent of the studies to provide a test of the failing firm thesis suggested
by Donald Dewey, i.e., that mergers "are merely a civilized alternative to
bankruptcy, or the voluntary liquidation that transfers assets from failing
to rising firms." 26 For the most part this comment has passed relatively un-
noticed and may have remained so were it not for an article by Henry
Manne which appeared in 1965.27 While Manne did not argue forcefully
in support of the Dewey position, he did make some effort to explain it.
Also, he implied that it offered strong support for his arguments. 28
If the Dewey thesis is correct, then a detailed examination of large
merger activity should show that a majority of all mergers should involve
companies which are (1) declining, (2) at or near the borderline of failing, or.
(3) actually losing money. If this position cannot be supported on the basis
of empirical evidence, it is obvious that it should be excluded as an im-
portant argument in the transfer of corporate wealth via merger.
The first such study was completed in 1964. It included rate of profit
information for 165 large acquired companies iii the year prior to their
acquisition. These data show that only 10 percent of those firms were ac-
tually losing money in the year prior to acquisition. At the other extreme,
more than 35 percent of the acquired companies earned 10 percent or more
on stockholder's equity after taxes.
TABLE IV
PROFITABILITY OF LARGE ACQUIRED CORPORATIONS IN Two FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION STUDIES
(percent of total mergers)
Rate of Returna Study Ab Study Be
Negative 10.3 4.3
0 -4.9 16.9 13.0
5.0-9.9 37.6 31.0
10.0-14.9 22.4 32.4
15.0-19.9 8.5 14.0
20.0 and over 4.3 4.6
a Profits after taxes as a percent of stockholder's equity.
b Includes 165 companies with assets of $10 million or more.
e Includes 401 companies with assets of $25 million or more.
NOTE: Figures subject to rounding.
SOURCE: Concentration Hearings Part, 1 at 129 (statement of H. Mueller) (see supra
note 7); FTC REPORT 57.
The data obtained from the most recent FTC study shows that the
relatively profitable position shown for the large acquired companies in the
earlier study was, if anything, understated. In the most recent FTC study,
26 Dewey, supra note 13, at 257.
27 Manne, supra note 14, at II1 et seq.
28 Manne's paper is an entertaining and articulate addition to the literature which
criticizes the present iaterpretation and application of our antimonopoly statutes. Its basic
shortcoming is that it accepts the arguments of many critics, without attempting to deter-
mine whether or not the arguments have merit.
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it is shown that only 4.3 percent of the large acquired companies had in-
curred losses in the year immediately prior to their acquisition. Also, a
substantially smaller proportion of them were experiencing relatively low
levels of profitability. The earlier study showed that 27.2 percent of the
acquired companies lost money or had a rate of profit of less than 5 percent
in the year prior to acquisition. By comparison, only 17.3 percent of the
firms included in the second study experienced losses or extremely low levels
of profitability. Symptomatic of the generally higher levels of profits seen in
the latter study are the figures showing the percentage of firms earning
profits of 10 percent or more- 51.1 percent in the second study compared
with 35.2 percent in the first.
Considering the staff and available resources of the FTC, the relatively
small sample (401 firms) which is analyzed in their recent study is somewhat
confusing. Given their access to individual company profit data, they should
have been able to report data for almost 90 percent of the whole sample.
Particularly troublesome is their failure to include those firms with assets
from $10-25 million in the analysis.
The data obtained in a parallel study conducted by the author for
almost 700 companies are shown in Table V. As would be expected, these
TABLE V
PRE-MERGYR PROFITS OF LARGE ACQUIRED CORPORATIONS: 1948-1968
(as percent of total mergers)
Distribution of
Rate of Returna Large Mergersb
Negative 4.8
0 -4.9 4.8
15.2
5.0-9.9 31.3
10.0-14.9 29.4
15.0-19.9 11.5
20.0 and over 7.8
a Profits after taxes as a percent of stockholder's equity.
b Includes 698 con3panies.
SouRcE: FTC; MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUALS, various issues; company annual reports.
data tend to substantiate, in general outline, the data included in the most
recent FTC study. The most notable difference is in the number of acquired
firms which earned profits of 20 percent or more in the year prior to acqui-
sition. My study shows 7.8 percent of the acquired companies had rates of
20 percent, compared with 4.3 percent and 4.6 percent respectively in the
two FTC studies. This is compensated for by modest changes elsewhere.
The most recent FTC study suggests that the average rate of profit
earned by all manufacturing corporations (except automobile manufac-
turers) over the past 15 years was approximately 10 percent.29 The data
29 FTC REPORT 57.
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contained in Table V indicate that the median profit rate for the sample
group of companies included in this study was slightly less than that.
Our primary interest, however, is in the extent to which differences may
exist in the level of profits of firms involved in conglomerate mergers as
compared with other types of mergers. Many discussions of conglomerate
mergers are couched in terms of advantages to be gained through diversifica-
tion which may result in stabilized profits.3 0 Hopefully, at least from the
acquiring company's position, this may mean the acquisition of companies
that actually have, or show promise of having, healthy profit positions. On
the other hand, it is sometimes inferred that past profitability may be less
important in the case of horizontal mergers. In horizontal mergers, the ac-
quiring company is seeking to improve its short-run market position by
eliminating an actual competitor, with the hope of increasing its long-run
profit position. In the absence of concrete data, either position is in the realm
of pure supposition.
Are there noticeable differences in the rate of return earned by firms
prior to their acquisition which can be related to the type of merger activity
involved? An examination of the data contained in Table VI and Figure 1
TABLE VI
PRE-MERGER PROFITS OF LARGE AcquIRED FIRMS, BY TYPE OF ACQUISITION: 1948-1968
(percent of total)
Type of Merger
Rate of Profita Vertical Horizontal Conglomerate All
Negative 2.6 6.9 6.1 4.8
0 -4.9 16.3 23.0 11.9 15.2
5.0-9.9 36.1 29.1 30.9 51.3
10.0-14.9 33.8 20.5 30.8 29.4
15.0-19.9 5.6 11.9 12.3 11.5
20.0 and over 5.6 8.5 8.0 7.8
a Profits after taxes as a percent of stockholder's equity for 698 large acquired corpora-
tions.
NOTE: Figures subject to rounding.
SOURCE: FTC; MooDY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUALS, various issues; company annual reports.
indicate that the answer to this question is clearly "yes." It should be pointed
out that the results depend upon the method employed in adding the sub-
categories together. The most recent FTC study places market extension
and horizontal mergers in the same general category. The object of such a
classification is somewhat unclear and would seem to obscure rather than
clarify the basic analysis.
The data shown in Figure 1 indicate that, quite clearly, conglomerate
mergers involved firms which, as a group, earned higher profits. Of the large
horizontal acquisitions, 59 percent involved corporations which had a rate
30 See, e.g., Gort, Diversification, Mergers, and Profits, in THE CO'POATE MERGER
39 (W. Alberts & j. Segall eds. 1966).
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FIGURE 1
PROFITABILITY or LARGE ACQUIRED CORPORATIONS IN YEAR PRIOR TO ACOUISITION,
BY TYPE OF MERGER: 1948-1968
Percent
of Firms Profit hate of Median Fira
Horizontal ..... t.6
40 Vertical ........ 9.2
Conglomerate .... 10.2
ALL ............. 9.9
30 c
20 i
V
0 1
Negative 0-4-9 5-9.9 10-14.9 15-19.9 20+
RATE OF REIURNa
a Profits after taxes as a percent of stockholder's equity.
SOURcE: Table VI.
of return of less than 10 percent, while the corresponding figures for vertical
and conglomerate mergers were 55.0 percent and 48.9 percent respectively.
The impression gained from examining the distribution of firms by rate of
profit and type of merger is supported by the data referring to rate of profit
earned by the median firm in each merger type category. The median profit
rate earned by firms involved in horizontal mergers was 8.8 percent. For
vertical mergers the profit rate was 9.2 percent. In the case of conglomerate
mergers, however, the corresponding figure was 10.2 percent. Therefore, the
evidence seems clear: conglomerate acquisitions involved companies which
had higher rates of return prior to their acquisitions than either of the two
other major categories. As a consequence, it is impossible to agree with the
FTC Report's conclusion that: "A disproportionate number of unprofitable
mergers involved horizontal and market-extension type acquisitions ... ",1
It is certainly true in the case of horizontal mergers, but not for market-
31 FTC REPORT 57. A portion of the difference between the results obtained by the
FTC and in this study may be attributed to the fact that the FTC omitted acquisitions
of firms with assets from $10 to $25 million from this comparison. Their omission sub-
stantially alters the results obtained.
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extension mergers. It seems that the FTC Report might have reached dif-
ferent conclusions had all the data at the Commission's disposal been utilized.
One final set of comparisons may assist in appraising the competitive
effect of these large mergers, i.e., how the profits of the acquired companies
compare with those of other corporations of the same size. This portion of
the analysis employs a slightly shorter time period - 1951-1966. Prior to
1951 the number of large acquisitions is so small that it is meaningless to
compare the rate of return data for acquired companies with those for all
other corporations of that size. The data in Table VII indicate that no ap-
TABLE VII
RATE OF PROFIT OF LARGE ACQUIRED MANUFACTURING FIRMS AND ALL
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, BY ASSET-SIZE CLASS: 1951-1966
Asset-Size Classes (Millions of Dollars)
$10-50 $50-100 Total
Year QFRa Merger QFRa Merger QFRa, b Merger
1951 7.8 9.0 9.9 7.1 7.9 8.1
1952 6.3 7.5 6.3 4.6 6.6 6.2
1953 6.5 7.1 6.0 5.8 6.7 6.3
1954 6.1 6.5 6.0 8.7 6.6 5.1
1955 7.5 6.1 7.7 9.0 8.3 7.0
1956 7.7 6.4 8.1 9.7 8.0 7.1
1957 6.5 5.9 6.9 8.0 7.1 6.3
1958 5.1 4.3 5.5 5.7 5.7 4.7
1959 6.7 5.0 7.1 6.2 6.9 5.3
1960 5.3 4.2 5.7 5.6 6.0 4.7
1961 4.9 3.9 5.4 5.3 5.8 4.0
1962 5.4 4.4 5.5 5.5 6.3 4.1
1963 5.3 4.4 5.8 5- 6.6 4.3
1964 6.2 6.1 6.7 6.2 7.4 5.0
1965 7.2 6.5 7.1 6.4 8.0 5.1
1966 7.5 8.0 7.6 6.0 8.0 6.4
a Annual average of quarterly data
b Data for all manufacturing corporations with assets of $10 million or more.
SOURCE: FTC-SEC QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORTS, various issues; MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL
MANUAL, various issues.
parent or consistent patterns of divergence exist between the two series over
the period in question. The average rate of return for "large acquired" com-
panies was higher than that for "all" corporations over some periods, and
lower in others. This is clearly the case for firms with assets of $100 million
or less. However, the two series tend to diverge somewhat in those firms with
assets of more than $100 million. This difference is reflected in the profit
data for all corporations with assets of $10 million or more. Fragmentary
data for 1967 and 1968 show that the difference between these two series has
been almost eliminated.
The data presented in this section have provided us with certain in-
sights into the profitability of large acquired companies compared with that
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of all corporations. The data show that the rate of profit earned by large
acquired companies in the year prior to acquisition was about equal to that
-or all large manufacturing corporations. The FTC Report indicates that
the average rate of return on equity after taxes over the past 15 years was
about 10 percent. The data contained in Table V show the average rate of
profit for the firms included in this study was about the same. In the same
context, the data in Table VII indicate that the rate of return earned by
large acquired companies prior to acquisition was roughly the same as others
of the same size.
The most important of these comparisons is that contained in Table VI.
These data show that conglomerate mergers seem to involve companies with
higher levels of profitability than those involved in other types of mergers.
Thus the argument that some make (that conglomerate mergers probably
involve a different set of corporate goals, i.e., diversification and the ac-
quisition of strong profit centers) seems to be verified. The data do show
that, on the average, conglomerate mergers involved more profitable com-
panies.
IV. GROWTH CHARACTERISTICS
The data presented in the preceding section may not, by themselves,
alter the position held by those who view mergers as an alternative to bank-
ruptcy. Despite the fact that only 5 percent of the large-acquired finns lost
money, the argument may still be made that the profits of the acquired com-
panies, although positive, may well have been declining in the period im-
mediately prior to their acquisition. Therefore, any reasonable analysis must
look not only at the rate of profit but also at the trend in the level of profits
of the acquired companies. In other words, the analysis should include at-
tention to changes in the level of corporate profits.
At best, this involves a number of factors which are difficult to separate.
Changes in the level of profitability alone may not provide an unambiguous
indicator of the viability of a corporation. For example, a decline in the
profitability of a company in the period immediately prior to acquisition
may simply mirror changes which are occurring throughout a given industry.
The problem is further complicated in this case, since the mergers under
examination occurred over a rather long (20 years) time-span. Despite the
possible magnitude of errors introduced by these and other problems, I have
calculated and included data showing the rate of return earned by this
group of large acquired companies over the three years prior to their ac-
quisition. These data show the rate of return earned by the large acquired
companies, by asset-size class. The rate of profit measure used in this analysis
is corporate profit, after taxes, as a percent of total assets.
These data show that the firms in the two smallest asset-size classes ex-
perienced slight decreases in their average level of profits. On the other hand,
the acquired firms with assets of $50 million or more showed, on the average,
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TABLE VIII
RATE OF PROFIT EARNED BY LARGE ACQUIRED MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS IN SELECTED
YEARS PRIOR TO THEIR ACQUISITION: 1949.1968, BY ASSET-SIZE CLASS
(profits after taxes as a percent of assets)
Profit Rate Prior to Acquisition
Asset-Size Class Third Year Last Year
(Millions)
$10-25 5.9 5.3
25-50 5.8 5.7
50-100 6.0 7.1
100-250 4.6 4.8
250 & over 2.8 3.1
SOURCE: FTC; MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUALS, various issues; company annual reports.
increases in their profit rates. Looking at the total number of firms involved
in this analysis, it does not appear that they have suffered any observable
decline in their rate of profitability over the three-year period immediately
prior to their acquisition. In other words, imminent disaster does not appear
to have been a problem for these companies.
Two additional data sets will complete this analysis of pre-merger
growth trends of large manufacturing corporations, The first of these (Table
IX and Figure 2) looks at the growth in the absolute level of profits of
acquired companies over the five years prior to their acquisition, by type of
merger. The second set (Table X and Figure 3) contain similar material,
but for asset growth over the same period. These are also subdivided by type
of merger. These figures are compared with the average rate of corporate
asset growth of manufacturing corporations over the period 1950-1968.
The data in Table IX and Figure 2 show, for example, that about 34.9
percent of the large acquired firms experienced a reduction in the absolute
level of their profits. Approximately the same share (34.6 percent) showed
increases of 51 percent or more. Nine percent of the firms experienced no
TABLE IX
PRE-MERGaR PROFIT GROWTH OF LARGE MANUFACTURING COMPANIES,
BY TYPE OF MERGER: 1948-1968
(percent of merger of each type)
Type of Merger
Percent of Change Horizontal Vertical Conglomerate All
Lossa 8,5 3.5 7.6 7.3
Declineb 41.9 27.9 24.3 27.6
No Change 4.3 11.6 9.8 9.0
+1 to +50 24.8 25.6 20.2 21.5
+51 to +150 12.8 19.8 25.2 22.5
+151 & more 7.7 11.6 12.9 12.1
a Firms included in this class showed losses either the last year or in both years.
b Profits of firms included in this class declined over the period but were positive.
SOURCE: FTC; MooDY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUALS, various issues; company annual reports.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 2
FIVE YEAR PRE-MERGER PROFIT GROWTH EXPERIENCE OF LARGE ACQUIRED CORPORATIONS,
BY TYPE OF MERGER: 1948-1968
Percent
of Firms
50
Change in Level of Profits of
Median Firm 
_ f
Horizontal ........ -
Vertical ........... +18
Conglomerate ...... +25
ALL ............... +17
LOSS Decline 0 +i-50% +51-150% +151+
TREND IN PROFITS
SOURCE: Table IN.
change, while the profits of 21.5 percent of the firms grew from 1 to 50
percent.
This examination of changes in the absolute level of profits tends to
highlight the differences which exist between the three different types of
mergers under analysis. By far, the worst profit performance experience is
that shown for firms involved in horizontal mergers. Slightly more than 50
percent of these firms experienced either losses or absolute declines in their
dollar level of profits over the five year period preceding their acquisition.
The median firm, in terms of loss or gain, experienced a reduction of 5 per-
cent in the absolute level of its profits over the five years prior to its ac-
quisition.
Firms involved in vertical mergers show a somewhat better experience
with respect to the dollar level of their profits. Only 31.4 percent of these
firms, compared with 50.4 percent of the horizontal acquisitions, showed
declines over this period. On the other hand, almost 60 percent of these
firms showed increases in amount of profit earned over the same period. The
40 L
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difference between the pre-merger performances of the large vertical and
horizontal mergers is typified by the profit level change experienced by the
median company in each group. While the median firm involved in horizon-
tal mergers exhibited a decline in its profit level of about 5 percent, the
median firm involved in vertical mergers showed an increase of about 18
percent.
The conglomerate mergers involved companies with somewhat better
profit experiences than either the horizontal or vertical ones. This shows up
quite clearly in the change in absolute level of profit experienced by the
median firm. These firms experienced an increase of about 25 percent in the
level of their profits over the five years prior to acquisition. Converting these
to annual average changes in profit level, the data show the annual increase
of 5 percent for conglomerate mergers and 3.6 percent for vertical mergers
compared with a loss of 1 percent in the case of the horizontal mergers.
Looking at the profit experience of all large acquired companies, it is
clear that over 93 percent of them made profits throughout the five years
prior to their acquisition. While the profits for some (34.5 percent) declined,
or at best, remained constant, one-half or more of them showed an increase
of 17 percent or more. This again does not seem to describe a group of
dying or declining firms. Most important, however, from our point of view,
is the markedly superior performance of the conglomerate acquisition.
What kind of an asset growth picture is shown for these companies?
The data indicate that, on the average, the acquired firms under examina-
tion experienced healthy increases in corporate assets over the five years
prior to their acquisition (see Table X). This is in marked contrast to the
TABLE X
PRE-MERGER ASSET GROWTH OF LARGE ACQUIRED MANUFACTURING COMPANIES,
BY TYPE OF MERGER: 1948-1968
(percent of merger of each type)
Type of Merger
Percent of Change Horizontal Vertical Conglomerate All
Declinea 13.1 10.4 10.0 10.5
No change 3.4 7.0 5.7 5.4
+1 to +50 62.4 59.4 52.1 54.6
+51 to +150 19.7 19.8 28.3 25.8
+151 & more 1.7 3.5 4.3 3.6
a Corporate assets of these companies declined over the five years prior to acquisition.
NOTE: Figures subject to rounding.
SouRcE: FTC; MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUALS, various issoes; company annual reports.
profit growth figures described above. For example, almost 35 percent of the
acquired firms showed lowering of profits over the five years prior to ac-
quisition, but only 10 percent showed a reduction in their dollar asset values.
Here too, the differences in the patterns of change are minimal.
The major difference between the horizontal and conglomerate merger
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groups is in the slightly larger number of firms in the latter class with profit
increases of 51 percent or more- 21.4 percent in the case of horizontal
mergers compared with 32.6 percent for the conglomerates. The similarity
between the groups is seen in the figures showing the change in level of assets
of the median firm in each class. The median firm in the horizontal merger
group showed an increase in assets of 29 percent over the five years prior to
acquisition, compared with 28 percent for the vertical and 35 percent for
the conglomerate.
FIGURE 3
FIVE YEAR PRE-MERGER ASSET GROWTH EXPERIENCE OF LARGE ACQUIRED CORPORATIONS,
BY TYPE OF MERGER: 1948-1968
Percent
of Firms
60- Change in Level of Assets of
Median Firm
Horizontal ...... +29%
Vertical......... +28
Conglomerate .... +35
ALL ............. +32
TREND IN ASSETS
SOURCE: Table X.
How well do the median growth rates shown in Figure 3 compare with
those for all manufacturing corporations? To answer this, average five-year
growth rates were computed for all United States manufacturing corpora-
tions between 1950 and 1968.32 These showed that the assets of all manu-
32 FTC-SEC, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORTS and IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME were
utilized.
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facturing corporations increased, on the average, 27.9 percent. This is almost
identical with the growth rates computed for the firms in the horizontal and
vertical groups, and only slightly less than those in the conglomerate group.
V. CONCLUSION
At the outset, the goals established for this paper were defined in rather
limited terms. To borrow a phrase from Mr. Justice Holmes, it is intended as
an "investigation of the obscure." 33 The knowledge gained from this analysis
will not provide a full or complete explanation of the economic consequences
of conglomerate mergers. Such an achievement may be possible, but not with
the present state of knowledge regarding the pre- and post-merger conditions
of both the acquired and acquiring companies.
On the other hand, it may assist in analyzing the validity of a number
of allegations that have been made with respect to (1) the probable viability
of corporations in the absence of being acquired, and (2) the short- and
long-term goals of various firms which engage in merger activity. This paper,
and the information contained in it, may serve to provide some insights into
these questions. More important, however, is the possibility that, as a result
of the presentation of these data, some present misconceptions and partial
truths may be effectively countered.
We have pointed out that some economists and others have argued that
merger may well be a welcome alternative (from an efficiency point of view
in the transfer of corporate assets) to bankruptcy, with its attendant dis-
integration of corporate assets and identity. If these arguments are taken
seriously, the acquiring firms might well be awarded a medal of merit for
their service to the economy. A careful examination of the facts, however,
showed that less than 10 percent of the large corporations which have been
acquired over the past 20 years have been at "death's door."
To be sure, some companies were losing money and others were earning
rather low rates of return at the time of their acquisition. At the other ex-
treme, however, almost 50 percent of them were earning a rate of return of
10 percent or more after taxes. These are not charity cases. Not only were
these firms profitable in the year prior to acquisition, but the majority of
them had experienced increases in their absolute dollar levels of profits and
assets in the five years prior to their acquisition. As a group, they enjoyed a
rate of return about equal to that being earned by all corporations over the
period under examination. Moreover, they had experienced increases in
their assets which were slightly greater than the average for all manufactur-
ing corporations between 1950 and 1968.
Have the large mergers we have witnessed over the past 20 years repre-
sented a response to actual or impending bankruptcy? The facts show that,
with major exceptions, the answer is clear. NOI
There remains one basic question, therefore. Do the firms which have
been involved in large conglomerate mergers have characteristics which set
33 See note 17 supra.
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them apart from firms which become a part of vertical and horizontal
mergers? Again, the data presented here seem to provide a clear answer. YES
In addition to the fact that conglomerate mergers basically involve com-
panies which operate in different markets (geographic or product), the firms
acquired seem to show, on the average, significantly different financial and
pre-merger growth characteristics.
First, firms involved in conglomerate mergers seem to have earned
higher rates of return than did the others. As a group, conglomerate firms
earned a rate of return on stockholder's equity after taxes of 10.2 percent,
compared with 8.8 percent in the case of the horizontal mergers (a 16 percent
differential).
Second, firms involved in conglomerate mergers showed an increase of
about 25 percent in the absolute level of profits earned over the five years
prior to their acquisition. Horizontal mergers, on the other hand, showed
an average decline of about 5 percent over the same period.
Third, relatively small differences existed between the rates of asset
growth of firms in these three merger groups. Horizontal mergers involved
firms whose assets had increased by 29 percent over the five years prior to
acquisition, while those of conglomerate mergers increased by 35 percent.
However, the contrast between the profit level changes and those for
assets provide an interesting commentary on the basic differences between
the horizontal and conglomerate mergers. Given the fact that their growth
rates, in terms of corporate assets, were approximately the same, the profit
level increases become quite significant. These data show the basic differ-
ences in the companies that are acquired, and a picture of the typical firm
which is acquired as a result of a conglomerate merger begins to come clear.
It is a firm (1) with a higher rate of profit than the average of other large
acquired companies; (2) which has experienced a slightly higher rate of
increase in its rate of asset growth than other acquired companies and all
manufacturing companies over the five years prior to its acquisition; and
(3) which has experienced substantially higher rates of increase in the level
of its profits than other large acquired companies.
On the average, conglomerate mergers do represent the disappearance
of strong and financially viable manufacturing corporations. They are cor-
porations which, in the absence of merger activity, economic theory suggests
would be the most logical future candidates to challenge the entrenched
position of the still larger corporations. Unfortunately, they are being ac-
quired by the larger companies today. The Clayton Act, as revised, speaks
in terms of a lessening of potential competition. There can be no doubt that
the elimination of almost 1,300 large manufacturing corporations, the bulk
of them strong and financially viable corporations, constitutes a long step
along that road.
